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Napoleon Bonaparte is a figure who continues to inspire and repel by equal measure, and the net result is the continued publication in English of a seemingly endless stream of biographies, not to mention studies of his numerous battles and campaigns and, rather less frequently, the empire that he created. Amongst this great torrent, however, there has been a somewhat surprising omission. Thus, not since 2002 has a collection of Napoleon’s military maxims appeared in English, whilst that was in turn separated from the one proceeding it by some fifty-nine years. As for the wider writings on strategy, tactics and the art of war contained in the emperor’s speeches, bulletins, newspaper articles and voluminous correspondence - a source which is infinitely more valuable given the apochryphal or, at least, unsubstantiated, nature of many of the sayings attributed to Napoleon - in the whole of the twentieth century, only one such work appeared and even that was highly selective in its approach. In consequence, there will be few scholars of the Napoleonic period who will not welcome this extensive collection of Napoleon’s thoughts on the subject which more than anything else made him what he was.
In reviewing such a work, of course, one is conscious that there are in fact two different foci of attention that need to be addressed. On the one hand, then, there is the scholar who has been noble enough to take on the task of systematising the vast corpus of material which is available to anyone foolhardy enough to tackle it, and on the other there is the ruler whose thoughts are being investigated and expounded. Beginning with the former, Bruno Colson is the leading Belgian expert on the Napoleonic period and, with this, the guiding spirit of the new museum on the battle of Waterloo that opened on the eve of the bicentenary in June 2015. So far as he is concerned, no praise is high enough (though it does have to be said that he was not always well-served by his translator: French armies, for example, did not advance in ‘packs’). If not absolutely comprehensive, the material is well chosen and discussed in a fashion that is as sensible and accessible, whilst the decision to insert it into the same structure as that of Clausewitz’s On War was little short of brilliant. It would, perhaps, have been helpful, however, if the dates of the quotations had been given in the text (the reader is rather forced constantly to look them up in the footnotes).
Full marks, then, for Professor Colson, but what of his subject? Here the picture is very different. At all events, reading through the seemingly endless extracts to which the reader is treated does not inspire this particular reviewer with confidence. In brief, there is too much contradiction, too much hypocrisy; too much self-interest. Take, for example, the issue of why battles are won and lost. Seemingly eager to denigrate the military achievements of the French Revolution, Napoleon several times tells us that battles such as Jemappes and Fleurus were won through a combination of the superiority of the French artillery (a legacy of the ancien regime) and, still more so, the great superiority in numbers generated by the levée en masse.  However, as soon as the boot is on the Allied foot, as it was in the campaigns of 1813-14, then the emperor changes his stance entirely: what matters is not numbers of men or guns, in both of which the Austrians, Prussians and Russians far outclassed the French, but morale, and, above all, a determination to keep fighting to the end come what may. This last being exactly what many of the marshals did not do in 1814, the reader is left with the very strong impression that Napoleon was writing from a fixed intention to argue that his downfall had been the result, not of defeat, but of betrayal. Equally odd, meanwhile, is his discussion of the laws of war: in so far as these are concerned, the emperor stresses his respect for their provisions, and condemns those who fail to do the same (above all, the British), but neither he nor Colson mentions the fact that the horrors on view when the British forces sacked Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz and San Sebastián were the direct result of a warning that any governor who surrendered his charge as soon as a breach had been blown in the walls rather than fighting on would be court-martialled and shot, this being an order that flew in the face of the conventions by which siege warfare had been conducted for the past 150 years or more. And, finally, there is the rant that is delivered on naval warfare: this, apparently, was hateful to Napoleon because it was impossible to subject it to the normal laws of war, and yet one wonders what he would have written had it been Gallia that ruled the waves rather than Britannia.
To conclude, then, Napoleon on War is certainly a book from which one can learn a great deal: it is, indeed, one of the most instructive works on Napoleon that the author has read for many years. However, whether it teaches anything that admirers of the emperor will enjoy reading is another matter.
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